

2550 Intro to cybersecurity

L18: Intro to Systems Security

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Thanks to Christo for
starting point for slides.

Threat Model


Principles


Intro to System Architecture

Hardware Support for Isolation

Examples







What is Memory?

Memory is essentially a spreadsheet with a single column

- Every row has a number, called an **address**
- Every cell holds 1 byte of data

Address	Contents
114	
113	0
112	0
111	0
110	8
109	
108	0
107	0
106	0
105	0
104	0
103	0
102	0
101	0
100	0

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Integers are typically four bytes

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CPUs understand instructions in assembly language

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```

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```
String my_str = "ABC";
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```
int my_num = 8;  
String my_str = "ABC";  
while (my_num > 0) my_num--;
```

Integers are typically four bytes


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
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How does a computer boot?


<https://youtu.be/MsKb0gR-4AM?t=36>



System Model: how does a computer boot?



More details



Layout of memory at boot




Figure 3 Intel® Architecture Memory Map at Power On

Details


CPU begins executing at f.fff0
BIOS firmware begins init of hw
Applies microcode patches
Execute Firmware Support Pkg (blob)
[Ram is setup] *OS*
Copy firmware to RAM *0.0000*
Begin executing in RAM *in the next slides*
Setup interrupts, timers, clocks
Bring up other cores
Setup PCI
Setup ACPI tables *power*
Execute OS loader

CPU

BIOS

MEM


System Model



System Model

On bootup, the **Operating System (OS)** loads itself into memory

- eg. DOS (before hw isolation)
- Typically places itself in high memory




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What is the role of the OS?

- Allow the user to run **processes**
- Often comes with a shell
 - Text shell like bash
 - Graphical shell like the Windows desktop
- Provides APIs to access devices
 - Offered as a convenience to application developers




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```
0.000000] microcode: microcode updated early to revision 0xca, date = 2019-10-03
0.000000] Linux version 5.3.0-64-generic (build@lcy01-and64-026) (gcc version 9.2.1 20191008 (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2)) #58-Ubuntu SMP Fri Jul 10 19:33:51 UTC 2020 (Ubuntu 5.3.0-64-58-generic 5.3.18)
0.000000] Command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.3.0-64-generic root=/dev/mapper/vgubuntu-root ro quiet splash vt.handoff=7
0.000000] KERNEL Supported cpus:
0.000000] Intel GenuineIntel
0.000000] AMD AuthenticAMD
0.000000] Hygon HygonGenuine
0.000000] Centaur CentaurHauls
0.000000] zhaoxin Shanghai
0.000000] x86/fpu: Supporting XSAVE feature 0x001: 'x87 floating point registers'
0.000000] x86/fpu: Supporting XSAVE feature 0x002: 'SSE registers'
0.000000] x86/fpu: Supporting XSAVE feature 0x004: 'AVX registers'
0.000000] x86/fpu: Supporting XSAVE feature 0x008: 'MPX bounds registers'
0.000000] x86/fpu: Supporting XSAVE feature 0x010: 'MPX CSR'
0.000000] x86/fpu: xstate_offset[2]: 576, xstate_sizes[2]: 256
0.000000] x86/fpu: xstate_offset[3]: 832, xstate_sizes[3]: 64
0.000000] x86/fpu: xstate_offset[4]: 896, xstate_sizes[4]: 64
0.000000] x86/fpu: Enabled xstate features 0x1f, context size is 960 bytes, using 'compacted' format.
0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x00000000000009efff] usable
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000009f000-0x0000000000000fffff] reserved
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x0000000000f33fff] usable
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000f54000-0x0000000000f57fff] reserved
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000f05000-0x0000000000f069fff] ACPI data
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000f06a000-0x0000000000f06afff] reserved
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000f06b000-0x0000000000f0d7fff] ACPI data
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000f0d8000-0x0000000000f1b1fff] ACPI NVS
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000f1b2000-0x0000000000f4cffff] reserved
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000f4c000-0x0000000000f4cefff] usable
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000f4f000-0x0000000000f7cffff] reserved
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000e000000-0x0000000000effffff] reserved
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000fe000000-0x000000000fe010fff] reserved
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000fec00000-0x000000000fec00fff] reserved
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000fec00000-0x000000000fec03fff] reserved
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000fec00000-0x000000000fec09fff] reserved
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000ff000000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved
0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x0000000080ffffff] usable
0.000000] NX (Execute Disable) protection: active
0.000000] e820: update [mem 0x657d3018-0x657e3457] usable ==> usable
0.000000] e820: update [mem 0x657d3018-0x657e3457] usable ==> usable
0.000000] extended physical RAM map:
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x00000000000009efff] usable
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x00000000000009f000-0x0000000000000fffff] reserved
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x000000000000657d3017] usable
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x0000000000657d3018-0x0000000000657e3457] usable
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x0000000000657e3458-0x00000000006f33fff] usable
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x00000000006f34000-0x00000000006f57fff] reserved
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x00000000006f58000-0x00000000006f69fff] ACPI data
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x00000000006f6a000-0x00000000006f6afff] reserved
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x00000000006f6b000-0x00000000006f6d7fff] ACPI data
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x00000000006f6d8000-0x00000000006f7b1fff] ACPI NVS
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x00000000006f7b2000-0x00000000006f7cffff] reserved
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x00000000006f7c000-0x00000000006f7cefff] usable
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x00000000006f7cf000-0x00000000006f7cffff] reserved
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x0000000000e000000-0x0000000000effffff] reserved
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x000000000fe000000-0x000000000fe010fff] reserved
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x000000000fec00000-0x000000000fec00fff] reserved
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x000000000fec00000-0x000000000fec03fff] reserved
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x000000000fec00000-0x000000000fec09fff] reserved
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x00000000ff000000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved
0.000000] reserve setup_data: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x0000000080ffffff] usable
0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by American Megatrends
0.000000] efi: ACPI: 1.70000 ACPI 2.10-0x6f117014 TPMFinalLog=0x6f11f000 SMBIOS=0x6f9de000 SMBIOS 3.0=0x6f9dd000 MEMATTR=0x66372018 ESRT=0x68146518 TPMEventLog=0x657e4018
0.000000] secureboot: Secure boot enabled
0.000000] Kernel is locked down from EFI secure boot; see man kernel lockdown.7
0.000000] SMBIOS 3.2.0 present.
0.000000] DMI: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC10i7FNH/NUC10i7FNB, BIOS FNCL357.0032.2019.1021.1624 10/21/2019
0.000000] tsc: Detected 1600.000 MHz processor
0.000376] tsc: Detected 1599.960 MHz TSC
0.000376] e820: update [mem 0x00000000-0x00000fff] usable ==> reserved
0.000379] e820: remove [mem 0x000a0000-0x000fffff] usable
0.000391] last_pfn = 0x881000 max_arch_pfn = 0x400000000
0.000398] MTRR default type: write-back
0.000399] MTRR fixed ranges enabled:
0.000401] 0000-9FFF write-back
0.000403] A000-BFFF uncachable
0.000405] C000-FFFF write-protect
```

```
[ 0.000406] MTRR variable ranges enabled:
[ 0.000409] 0 base 0080000000 mask 7f80000000 uncachable
[ 0.000410] 1 base 007c000000 mask 7ffc000000 uncachable
[ 0.000412] 2 base 007a000000 mask 7ffe000000 uncachable
[ 0.000413] 3 base 0079000000 mask 7fff000000 uncachable
[ 0.000415] 4 base 0078000000 mask 7fff800000 uncachable
[ 0.000417] 5 base 2000000000 mask 6000000000 uncachable
[ 0.000418] 6 base 1000000000 mask 7000000000 uncachable
[ 0.000420] 7 base 4000000000 mask 4000000000 uncachable
[ 0.000421] 8 disabled
[ 0.000422] 9 disabled
[ 0.001256] x86/PAT: Configuration [0-7]: WB WC UC- WB WP UC-WT
[ 0.001570] last_pfn = 0x6fc4f_max_arch_pfn = 0x400000000
[ 0.021713] srt: Reserving ESRT space [0x0000000000146518 to 0x0000000000146550].
[ 0.021720] e820: update [mem 0x81460000-0x8146ffff] usable == reserved
[ 0.021847] check: Scanning 1 areas for low memory corruption
[ 0.021853] Using BG pages for direct mapping
[ 0.022564] RAMDISK: [mem 0x3c54000-0x3ffffffffff]
[ 0.022580] ACPI: ACPITable: Early table checksum verification disabled
[ 0.022584] ACPI: RSDP 0x00000000f117014 000024 (v02 INTEL)
[ 0.022589] ACPI: XSDT 0x00000000f116728 00000C (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022598] ACPI: FACP 0x00000000f802000 000114 (v06 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 00010013)
[ 0.022600] ACPI: DSDT 0x00000000f08f000 042561 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022610] ACPI: FACS 0x00000000f01B000 000040
[ 0.022614] ACPI: MCFG 0x00000000f030000 00003C (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 MSFT 00000097)
[ 0.022618] ACPI: SSDT 0x00000000f008000 001B4A (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022621] ACPI: DTDT 0x00000000f00E000 000000 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 00010013)
[ 0.022627] ACPI: SSDT 0x00000000f08A000 0031C6 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022631] ACPI: HPET 0x00000000f007000 000038 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022635] ACPI: SSDT 0x00000000f086000 003384 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022639] ACPI: SSDT 0x00000000f084000 001478 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022643] ACPI: SSDT 0x00000000f080000 003280 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022648] ACPI: NHLT 0x00000000f0D0000 000020 (v00 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022652] ACPI: LPIT 0x00000000f077000 000094 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022656] ACPI: SSDT 0x00000000f07D000 002728 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022660] ACPI: SSDT 0x00000000f07A000 00009C (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022664] ACPI: DBGX 0x00000000f079000 000034 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022668] ACPI: DBG2 0x00000000f078000 000054 (v00 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022672] ACPI: SSDT 0x00000000f076000 001B66 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022677] ACPI: TPM2 0x00000000f074000 00004C (v04 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 00000000)
[ 0.022681] ACPI: DMAR 0x00000000f075000 0000A8 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022685] ACPI: WSMT 0x00000000f07E000 000028 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 00010013)
[ 0.022689] ACPI: APIC 0x00000000f073000 0000F4 (v04 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 00010013)
[ 0.022693] ACPI: FPD0 0x00000000f072000 000004 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 00010013)
[ 0.022707] ACPI: Local APIC address 0xfce00000
[ 0.023236] No NUMA configuration found
[ 0.023238] Faking a node at [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000800000]
[ 0.023244] NODE_DATA(0) allocated [mem 0x80f0000-0x80ff0000]
[ 0.023690] Zone ranges:
[ 0.023700] DMA [mem 0x00000000000001000-0x0000000000000000]
[ 0.023702] DMA32 [mem 0x0000000001000000-0x0000000000000000]
[ 0.023703] Normal [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x0000000000000000]
[ 0.023705] Device empty
[ 0.023706] Movable zone start for each node
[ 0.023711] Early memory node ranges
[ 0.023713] node 0: [mem 0x00000000000001000-0x0000000000000000]
[ 0.023714] node 0: [mem 0x00000000000001000-0x0000000000000000]
[ 0.023716] node 0: [mem 0x00000000000001000-0x0000000000000000]
[ 0.023717] node 0: [mem 0x00000000000001000-0x0000000000000000]
[ 0.024270] Zeroed struct page in unavailable ranges: 41229 pages
[ 0.024272] Initmem setup node 0 [mem 0x00000000000001000-0x0000000000000000]
[ 0.024274] On node 0 totalpages: 814611
[ 0.024276]   DMA zone: 64 pages used for memmap
[ 0.024277]   DMA zone: 25 pages reserved
[ 0.024278]   DMA zone: 3998 pages, LIFO batch:0
[ 0.024379]   DMA32 zone: 6910 pages used for memmap
[ 0.024380]   DMA32 zone: 442197 pages, LIFO batch:63
[ 0.039990] Normal zone: 122944 pages used for memmap
[ 0.039991] Normal zone: 7868416 pages, LIFO batch:63
[ 0.207130] Reserving Intel graphics memory at [mem 0x790000000-0x7cffffff]
[ 0.207882] ACPI: PM-Timer IO Port: 0x8080
[ 0.207884] ACPI: Local APIC address: 0xfce00000
[ 0.207894] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x01] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207895] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x02] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207896] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x03] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207897] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x04] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207897] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x05] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207898] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x06] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207899] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x07] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207900] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x08] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207901] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x09] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207902] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x0a] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207902] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x0b] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207903] ACPI: LAPIC_NMI (acpi_id[0x0c] high edge lint[0x1])
[ 0.207957] IOAPIC[0]: apic_id 32, version 32, address 0xfce00000, GSI 0-119
[ 0.207960] ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 9 global_irq 2 dfl dfl)
[ 0.207962] ACPI: INT_SRC_OVR (bus 0 bus_irq 9 global_irq 9 high level)
[ 0.207963] ACPI: IRQ0 used by override.
[ 0.207965] ACPI: IRQ0 used by override.
[ 0.207968] Using ACPI (MADT) for SMP configuration information
[ 0.207969] ACPI: NPET id: 0x8086a201 base: 0xfed00000
[ 0.207974] smpboot: Allowing 12 CPUs, 0 hotplug CPUs
[ 0.208001] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x00000000-0x00000000]
[ 0.208003] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x00000000-0x00000000]
[ 0.208005] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x657d3000-0x657d3000]
[ 0.208008] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x657e3000-0x657e3000]
[ 0.208010] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x68146000-0x68146000]
[ 0.208012] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x6c540000-0x6c540000]
[ 0.208013] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x6f058000-0x6f058000]
[ 0.208014] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x6f06a000-0x6f06a000]
[ 0.208015] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x6f06b000-0x6f06b000]
[ 0.208015] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x6f06b000-0x6f06b000]
[ 0.208016] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x6f1b2000-0x6f1b2000]
[ 0.208018] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x6fc4f000-0x7cffffff]
[ 0.208019] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x7d000000-0x7d000000]
[ 0.208020] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x80000000-0x80000000]
[ 0.208021] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x80000000-0x80000000]
[ 0.208022] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0xfed00000-0xfed00000]
[ 0.208022] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0xfed11000-0xfed10000]
[ 0.208023] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0xfce00000-0xfce00000]
[ 0.208024] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0xfce01000-0xfce01000]
[ 0.208025] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0xfed00000-0xfed03000]
[ 0.208025] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0xfed04000-0xfed00000]
[ 0.208026] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0xfce00000-0xfce00000]
[ 0.208027] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0xfce01000-0xfce01000]
[ 0.208028] PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0xf8000000-0xf8000000]
[ 0.208030] [mem 0x7d000000-0xf8000000] available for PCI devices
[ 0.208033] Booting paravirtualized kernel on bare hardware
[ 0.208036] clocksource: refined-jiffies: mask: 0xffffffff max_cycles: 0xffffffff, max_idle_ns: 7645519600211568 ns
[ 0.208045] setup_percpu: NR_CPUS:8192 nr_cpumask_bits:12 nr_cpu_ids:12 nr_node_ids:1
[ 0.208519] percpu: Embedded 54 CPUs/cpu s184320 r8192 d28672 u262144
[ 0.208530] pcpu-allo: s184320 r8192 d28672 u262144 alloc=1x2897152
[ 0.208531] pcpu-allo: [0] 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 [0] 08 09 10 11 --- ---
[ 0.208576] Built 1 zonelists, mobility grouping on. Total pages: 8146468
[ 0.208577] Policy zone: Normal
[ 0.208579] Kernel command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.3.0-64-generic root=/dev/mapper/vgubuntu-root ro quiet splash vt.handoff=7
[ 0.211269] Dentry cache hash table entries: 4194304 (order: 13, 33554432 bytes, linear)
[ 0.211273] Inode-cache hash table entries: 2097152 (order: 12, 16777216 bytes, linear)
[ 0.212724] mem auto-init: stack:off, heap alloc:off, heap free:off
[ 0.217959] Calgary: detecting Calgary via BIOS EBDA area
[ 0.217961] Calgary: Unable to locate Rio Grande table in EBDA - bailing!
[ 0.326171] Memory: 32410828K/33558444K available (14339K kernel code, 387K rwdata, 4732K rodata, 2680K init, 5040K bss, 847616K reserved, 0K cma-reserved)
[ 0.326180] random: get_random_u64 called from kernel.cad9c40 with crng_init=0
[ 0.326431] SLUB: Walign=64, Order=0-3, MinfoObjects=0, CPUs=12, Nodes=1
[ 0.326453] ftrace: allocating 43632 entries in 171 pages
[ 0.355621] rcu: Hierarchical RCU implementation.
[ 0.355623] rcu: RCU restricting CPUs from NR_CPUS=8192 to nr_cpu_ids=12.
[ 0.355624] Tasks RCU enabled.
[ 0.355626] rcu: RCU calculated value of scheduler-enlistment delay is 25 jiffies.
[ 0.355627] rcu: Adjusting geometry for rcu_fanout_leaf=16, nr_cpu_ids=12
[ 0.361328] NR_IRQS: 524544, nr_irqs: 2152, preallocated irqs: 16
[ 0.361842] random: crng done (Trusting CPU's manufacturer)
[ 0.361879] vt handoff: transparent VT on vt#7
[ 0.361889] Console: colour dummy device 80x25
[ 0.361895] printk: console [tty0] enabled
[ 0.361918] ACPI: Core revision 20190703
[ 0.362625] clocksource: hpet: mask: 0xffffffff max_cycles: 0xffffffff, max_idle_ns: 79635855245 ns
[ 0.362761] APIC: Switch to symmetric I/O mode setup
[ 0.362764] DMAR: Host address width 39
[ 0.362766] DMAR: DRHD base: 0x00000000f900000 flags: 0x0
[ 0.362774] DMAR: dmarr: req_base_addr 0xf900000 ver 1:0 cap 1c000040660462 ecap 19e2ff050e
```

```
[ 0.696153] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
[ 0.696156] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [io 0x0000-0xcfff window]
[ 0.696158] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [io 0x0000-0xcfff window]
[ 0.696159] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0x000a0000-0x000bffff window]
[ 0.696161] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0x000e0000-0x000e3fff window]
[ 0.696162] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0x000e4000-0x000e7fff window]
[ 0.696163] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0x000e8000-0x000ebfff window]
[ 0.696165] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0x000ec000-0x000effff window]
[ 0.696166] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0x000f0000-0x000fffff window]
[ 0.696167] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0x7d000000-0xdfffffff window]
[ 0.696169] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0x400000000-0x7fffffff window]
[ 0.696170] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0xcfc80000-0xfe7fffff window]
[ 0.696172] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [bus 00-fe]
[ 0.696187] pci 0000:00:00.0: [8086:9b51] type 00 class 0x060000
[ 0.696942] pci 0000:00:02.0: [8086:9bca] type 00 class 0x030000
[ 0.696959] pci 0000:00:02.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x602200000-0x6022ffffff 64bit]
[ 0.696967] pci 0000:00:02.0: reg 0x18: [mem 0x400000000-0x400ffffff 64bit pref]
[ 0.696973] pci 0000:00:02.0: reg 0x20: [io 0x3000-0x303f]
[ 0.697334] pci 0000:00:08.0: [8086:1911] type 00 class 0x080000
[ 0.697352] pci 0000:00:08.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x602312000-0x6023120fff 64bit]
[ 0.697682] pci 0000:00:12.0: [8086:02f9] type 00 class 0x118000
[ 0.697708] pci 0000:00:12.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x60231f000-0x60231fffff 64bit]
[ 0.698071] pci 0000:00:14.0: [8086:02ed] type 00 class 0xc03030
[ 0.698086] pci 0000:00:14.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x602310000-0x602310ffff 64bit]
[ 0.698176] pci 0000:00:14.0: PME# supported from D3hot D3cold
[ 0.698639] pci 0000:00:14.2: [8086:02ef] type 00 class 0x050000
[ 0.698662] pci 0000:00:14.2: reg 0x10: [mem 0x602318000-0x602319ffff 64bit]
[ 0.698675] pci 0000:00:14.2: reg 0x18: [mem 0x60231e000-0x60231effff 64bit]
[ 0.699033] pci 0000:00:14.3: [8086:02f0] type 00 class 0x028000
[ 0.699130] pci 0000:00:14.3: reg 0x10: [mem 0x602314000-0x602314ffff 64bit]
[ 0.699383] pci 0000:00:14.3: PME# supported from D0 D3hot D3cold
[ 0.699892] pci 0000:00:15.0: [8086:0268] type 00 class 0xc80000
[ 0.700034] pci 0000:00:15.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x00000000-0x0000ffff 64bit]
[ 0.700757] pci 0000:00:15.2: [8086:02ea] type 00 class 0xc80000
[ 0.700899] pci 0000:00:15.2: reg 0x10: [mem 0x00000000-0x0000ffff 64bit]
[ 0.701695] pci 0000:00:16.0: [8086:0260] type 00 class 0xc78000
[ 0.701636] pci 0000:00:16.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x60231b000-0x60231bffff 64bit]
[ 0.701726] pci 0000:00:16.0: PME# supported from D3hot
[ 0.702164] pci 0000:00:17.0: [8086:02d3] type 00 class 0x010601
[ 0.702186] pci 0000:00:17.0: reg 0x10: [mem 0x96222000-0x962221ffff]
[ 0.702195] pci 0000:00:17.0: reg 0x14: [mem 0x96222000-0x9622230fff]
[ 0.702204] pci 0000:00:17.0: reg 0x18: [io 0x3000-0x3097]
[ 0.702213] pci 0000:00:17.0: reg 0x1c: [io 0x3080-0x3083]
[ 0.702222] pci 0000:00:17.0: reg 0x20: [io 0x3060-0x307f]
[ 0.702230] pci 0000:00:17.0: reg 0x24: [mem 0x96222000-0x962227fff]

[ 0.814539] NET: Registered protocol family 2
[ 0.814767] tcp_listen_portaddr_hash hash table entries: 16384 (order: 6, 262144 bytes, linear)
[ 0.815038] TCP established hash table entries: 262144 (order: 9, 2097152 bytes, linear)
[ 0.815477] TCP bind hash table entries: 65536 (order: 8, 1048576 bytes, linear)
[ 0.815587] TCP: Hash tables configured (established 262144 bind 65536)
[ 0.815676] UDP hash table entries: 16384 (order: 7, 524288 bytes, linear)
[ 0.815819] UDP-Lite hash table entries: 16384 (order: 7, 524288 bytes, linear)
[ 0.815965] NET: Registered protocol family 1
[ 0.815971] NET: Registered protocol family 44
[ 0.815984] pci 0000:00:02.0: Video device with shadowed ROM at [mem 0x000c0000-0x000dffff]
[ 0.816666] pci 0000:01:00.0: CLS mismatch (64 is 128), using 64 bytes
[ 0.816828] pci 0000:01:00.0: enabling device (0002 -> 0003)
[ 0.817224] Trying to unpack roots image as initramfs...
[ 0.986156] Initramfs unpacking failed: Decoding failed
[ 0.93397] Freeing initrd memory: 50856K
[ 0.933425] DMAR: Intel-IOMMU force enabled due to platform opt in
[ 0.933456] DMAR: No ATRR found
[ 0.933546] DMAR: dmar0: Using Queued invalidation

[ 4.346737] idma64 idma64.1: Found Intel integrated DMA 64-bit
[ 4.351278] mei_me 0000:00:16.0: hbm: dma setup response: failure = 3 REJECTED
[ 4.352899] Bluetooth: Core ver 2.22
[ 4.352898] NET: Registered protocol family 31
[ 4.352898] Bluetooth: HCI device and connection manager initialized
[ 4.352901] Bluetooth: HCI socket layer initialized
[ 4.352902] Bluetooth: L2CAP socket layer initialized
[ 4.352903] Bluetooth: SCO socket layer initialized
[ 4.389562] 88x2bu: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.
[ 4.403328] cryptd: cpu0_cpu_qlen set to 1000
[ 4.406575] Intel(R) Wireless WiFi driver for Linux
[ 4.406576] Copyright(c) 2003-2015 Intel Corporation
[ 4.406641] iwlmwifi 0000:00:14.3: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
[ 4.415431] iwlmwifi 0000:00:14.3: TLV_FW_FSEQ_VERSION: FSEQ Version: 43.2.23.17
[ 4.415434] iwlmwifi 0000:00:14.3: Found debug destination: EXTERNAL_DRAM
[ 4.415435] iwlmwifi 0000:00:14.3: Found debug configuration: 0
[ 4.415592] iwlmwifi 0000:00:14.3: loaded firmware version 48.4fa8041f.0 op_mode iwlmvm
[ 4.424971] AVX2 version of gcm_enc/dec engaged.
[ 4.424972] AES CTR mode by8 optimization enabled
[ 4.427194] usbcore: registered new interface driver btusb
[ 4.428100] Bluetooth: hcib8: Firmware revision 0.0 build 62 week 31 2019


[ 1.103257] usb usb1: New USB device found, idVendor=1d6b, idProduct=0002, bcdDevice= 5.03
[ 1.103259] usb usb1: New USB device strings: Mfr=3, Product=2, SerialNumber=1
[ 1.103261] usb usb1: Product: xHCI Host Controller
[ 1.103263] usb usb1: Manufacturer: Linux 5.3.0-64-generic xhci-hcd
[ 1.103264] usb usb1: SerialNumber: 0000:00:14.0
[ 1.103469] hub 1-0:1.0: USB hub found
[ 1.103489] hub 1-0:1.0: 12 ports detected
[ 1.106061] xhci_hcd 0000:00:14.0: xHCI Host Controller
[ 1.106066] xhci_hcd 0000:00:14.0: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 2
[ 1.106071] xhci_hcd 0000:00:14.0: Host supports USB 3.1 Enhanced SuperSpeed
[ 1.106121] usb usb2: New USB device found, idVendor=1d6b, idProduct=0003, bcdDevice= 5.03
[ 1.106122] usb usb2: New USB device strings: Mfr=3, Product=2, SerialNumber=1
[ 1.106124] usb usb2: Product: xHCI Host Controller
[ 1.106126] usb usb2: Manufacturer: Linux 5.3.0-64-generic xhci-hcd
[ 1.106127] usb usb2: SerialNumber: 0000:00:14.0
[ 1.106307] hub 2-0:1.0: USB hub found
[ 1.106321] hub 2-0:1.0: 6 ports detected
[ 1.107605] usb: port power management may be unreliable
[ 1.107867] xhci_hcd 0000:39:00.0: xHCI Host Controller
[ 1.107874] xhci_hcd 0000:39:00.0: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 3
[ 1.109069] xhci_hcd 0000:39:00.0: hc params 0x200077c1 hci version 0x110 quirks 0x0000000200009810
[ 1.109318] usb usb3: New USB device found, idVendor=1d6b, idProduct=0002, bcdDevice= 5.03
[ 1.109320] usb usb3: New USB device strings: Mfr=3, Product=2, SerialNumber=1
[ 1.109322] usb usb3: Product: xHCI Host Controller
[ 1.109323] usb usb3: Manufacturer: Linux 5.3.0-64-generic xhci-hcd
[ 1.109325] usb usb3: SerialNumber: 0000:39:00.0
[ 1.109508] hub 3-0:1.0: USB hub found
[ 1.109520] hub 3-0:1.0: 2 ports detected
[ 1.109708] xhci_hcd 0000:39:00.0: xHCI Host Controller
```

What happens after boot?


```
CentOS Linux 7 (Core)  
Kernel 3.10.0-327.el7.x86_64 on an x86_64  
rhcsa login: _
```

Memory Unsafety

~~DOS~~




Problem: any process can read/write
any memory




Memory Unsafety

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
Memory Unsafety

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
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
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Device Unsafety

Problem: any process can access
any hardware device directly


Access control is enforced by the
OS, but OS APIs can be bypassed



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Device Unsafety

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Review

Old systems did not protect memory or devices


- Any process could access any memory
- Any process could access any device

Problems

- No way to enforce access controls on users or devices
- Processes can steal from or destroy each other
- Processes can modify or destroy the OS

On old computers, systems security was **literally impossible**

ISOLATION



Threat Model

Principles

Intro to System Architecture

Hardware Support for Isolation

Examples



Towards Modern Architecture

To achieve systems security, we need **process isolation**

- Processes cannot read/write memory arbitrarily
- Processes cannot access devices directly

How do we achieve this?

Hardware support for isolation

1. Protected mode execution (a.k.a. process rings)
2. Virtual memory

Needed for process isolation.



Protected Mode



Protected Mode

Most modern CPUs support **protected mode**

x86 CPUs support three rings with different privileges

- Ring 0: Operating System
 - Code in this ring may directly access any device




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 - Code in these rings may directly access some devices
 - May not change the protection level of the CPU




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- Ring 3: userland
 - Code in this ring may not directly access devices
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
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Most OSes only use rings 0 and 3



Ring -1, -2, -3

“Google cited worries that the Intel ME (actually MINIX) code runs on their CPU's deepest access level — Ring "-3" — and also runs a web server component that allows anyone to remotely connect to remote computers, even when the main OS is turned off.”

System Boot Sequence

1. On startup, the CPU starts in 16-bit real mode
 - Protected mode is disabled
 - Any process can access any device

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 - OS decides what Ring to place other processes in

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2. BIOS executes, finds and loads the OS
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 - OS code is now running in Ring 0
 - OS decides what Ring to place other processes in
4. Shell gets executed, user may run programs
 - User processes are placed in Ring 3


Restriction on Privileged Instructions

What CPU instructions are restricted in protected mode?


- Any instruction that modifies the CR0 register
 - Controls whether protected mode is enabled
- Any instruction that modifies the CR3 register
 - Controls the virtual memory configuration
 - More on this later...
- hlt – Halts the CPU
- sti/cli – enable and disable interrupts
- in/out – directly access hardware devices

If a Ring 3 process tries any of these things, it immediately crashes

How to change modes



How to change modes



Changing Modes

Applications often need to access the OS APIs

- Writing files
- Displaying things on the screen
- Receiving data from the network
- etc...

But the OS is Ring 0, and processes are Ring 3

How do processes get access to the OS?

Interrupt handlers

Changing Modes

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
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
How do processes get access to the OS?

- Invoke OS APIs with special assembly instructions
 - Interrupt: `int 0x80`
 - System call: `sysenter` or `syscall`
- `int/sysenter/syscall` cause a mode transfer from Ring 3 to Ring 0

Mode Transfer



Mode Transfer

- 
- The diagram illustrates the process of mode transfer from Userland to Kernel Mode. It features two vertical labels on the left: 'Userland' and 'Kernel Mode'. A blue bracket groups the first step, which occurs in Userland. A yellow bracket groups the second step, which occurs in Kernel Mode. The steps are as follows:
- Userland**
 - 1. Application executes trap (`int`) instruction
 - EIP, CS, and EFLAGS get pushed onto the stack
 - Mode switches from ring 3 to ring 0
 - Kernel Mode**
 - 2. Save the state of the current process
 - Push EAX, EBX, ..., etc. onto the stack

Mode Transfer

Userland

1. Application executes trap (`int`) instruction

- EIP, CS, and EFLAGS get pushed onto the stack
- Mode switches from ring 3 to ring 0

Kernel Mode


2. Save the state of the current process

- Push EAX, EBX, ..., etc. onto the stack


3. Locate and execute the correct syscall handler

Mode Transfer

Userland


- 
- A blue bracket on the left side of the first list item, grouping it under the 'Userland' label.
1. Application executes trap (`int`) instruction
 - EIP, CS, and EFLAGS get pushed onto the stack
 - Mode switches from ring 3 to ring 0

Kernel Mode


- 
- A yellow bracket on the left side of the remaining list items, grouping them under the 'Kernel Mode' label.
2. Save the state of the current process
 - Push EAX, EBX, ..., etc. onto the stack
 3. Locate and execute the correct syscall handler
 4. Restore the state of process
 - Pop EAX, EBX, ... etc.

Mode Transfer

Userland


- 
1. Application executes trap (`int`) instruction
 - EIP, CS, and EFLAGS get pushed onto the stack
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Kernel Mode


- 
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 - Push EAX, EBX, ..., etc. onto the stack
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 - Pop EAX, EBX, ... etc.
 5. Place the return value in EAX

Mode Transfer


Userland

- 
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Kernel Mode


- 
2. Save the state of the current process
 - Push EAX, EBX, ..., etc. onto the stack
 3. Locate and execute the correct syscall handler
 4. Restore the state of process
 - Pop EAX, EBX, ... etc.
 5. Place the return value in EAX
 6. Use `iret` to return to the process
 - Switches back to the original mode (typically 3)

Protection in Action



Protected mode stops direct access to devices
All device access must go through the OS
OS will impose access control checks

Protection in Action




Protected mode stops direct access to devices

All device access must go through the OS

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
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
Protection in Action

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


Protection in Action

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


Protection in Action




Protection in Action

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


Protection in Action

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


Protection in Action




Protection in Action

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
Protection in Action

Protected mode stops direct access to devices
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Protection in Action

Protected mode stops direct access to devices
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
Virtual Memory



Status Check

At this point we have
protected the devices
attached to the system...


... But we have not
protected memory



Status Check

At this point we have protected the devices attached to the system...


... But we have not protected memory



Status Check

At this point we have protected the devices attached to the system...

... But we have not
protected memory



Memory Isolation and Virtual Memory

Modern CPUs support **virtual memory**

Creates the illusion that each process runs in its own, empty memory space

- Processes can not read/write memory used by other processes
- Processes can not read/write memory used by the OS

Memory Isolation and Virtual Memory

Modern CPUs support **virtual memory**

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- Processes can not read/write memory used by other processes
- Processes can not read/write memory used by the OS

In later courses, you will learn how virtual memory is implemented

- Base and bound registers
- Segmentation
- Page tables


Today, we will do the cliffnotes version...

Physical
Memory

4 GB


OS

0



Physical Memory

4 GB



0

Physical Memory



Virtual Memory Process 1





Chrome
believes it is the
only thing in
memory

Physical Memory



Virtual Memory Process 1





Virtual Memory Process 1

4 GB




VMM

- VM addresses need to be mapped to physical addresses


INVALID

CPU



Physical Memory

4 GB



Virtual Memory

Process 1


4 GB

Read
Address
16734



0

CPU



Physical Memory

4 GB

OS

Physical
Address:
81102



0

Virtual Memory Process 1

4 GB

Read
Address
16734




0

Page Table

Virtual Addr.	Physical Addr.
16732	81100
16734	81102
16736	93568
16738	93570

CPU



Physical Memory

4 GB

OS



Physical
Address:
81102

0

Virtual Memory Process 1

4 GB

Read
Address
16734




0

Page Table

Virtual Addr.	Physical Addr.
16732	81100
16734	81102
16736	93568
16738	93570

CPU



Physical Memory

4 GB

OS



Physical
Address:
81102



0

Virtual Memory Implementation

Each process has its own virtual memory space

- Each process has a page table that maps its virtual space into physical space
- CPU translates virtual address to physical addresses on-the-fly

• OS manages the page table to ensure process isolation.

Virtual Memory Implementation

Each process has its own virtual memory space

- Each process has a page table that maps its virtual space into physical space
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OS creates the page table for each process

- Installing page tables in the CPU is a protected, Ring 0 instruction
- Processes cannot modify their page tables

Virtual Memory Implementation

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What happens if a process tries to read/write memory outside its page table?


- Segmentation Fault or Page Fault
- Process crashes
- In other words, no way to escape virtual memory

VM in Action

Processes can only read/
write within their own
virtual memory

Processes cannot change
their own page tables


*Only Ring 0 can
change the page table*



VM in Action

Processes can only read/
write within their own
virtual memory


Processes cannot change
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VM in Action

Processes can only read/
write within their own
virtual memory


Processes cannot change
their own page tables



VM in Action

Processes can only read/
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virtual memory


Processes cannot change
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VM in Action

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
Processes cannot change
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VM in Action

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
Processes cannot change
their own page tables



VM in Action

Processes can only read/
write within their own
virtual memory

Processes cannot change
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Threat Model

Intro to System Architecture

Hardware Support for Isolation

Examples

Principles

Review

At this point, we have achieved process isolation

- Protected mode execution prevents direct device access
- Virtual memory prevents direct memory access

Requires CPU support

- All moderns CPUs support these techniques

Requires OS support

- All moderns OS support these techniques
- OS controls process rings and page tables



Review

At this point, we have achieved process isolation

- Protected mode execution prevents direct device access
- Virtual memory prevents direct memory access

Requires CPU support

- All moderns CPUs support these techniques

Requires OS support

- All moderns OS support these techniques
- OS controls process rings and page tables

Warning: bugs in the OS may compromise process isolation



ps -ax

TTY	STAT	TIME	COMMAND	302 ?	S<	0:00	[loop11]	1635 ?	Ssl	0:07	/usr/bin/gnome-shell
1 ?	Ss	0:02	/sbin/init splash	303 ?	S<	0:00	[loop12]	1678 ?	Ssl	0:00	ibus-daemon --panel disable --xim
2 ?	S	0:00	[kthreadd]	332 ?	I<	0:00	[iprt-VBoxQueue]	1689 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/ibus-dconf
3 ?	I<	0:00	[rcu_sched]	355 ?	I<	0:00	[cryptd]	1690 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/ibus-extension-gtk3
4 ?	I<	0:00	[rcu_parp_gp]	347 ?	Ss	0:00	/lib/systemd/systemd-resolved	1693 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/ibus-x11 --kill-daemon
6 ?	I<	0:00	[worker/0:0H-kbblock]	548 ?	Ssl	0:00	/lib/systemd/systemd-timesyncd	1695 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/ibus-portal
7 ?	I	0:00	[worker/0:1-events]	585 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/lib/accountsservice/accounts-daemon	1731 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/at-spi2-registrdy --use-gnome-session
9 ?	I<	0:00	[mm_percpu_wq]	586 ?	Ss	0:00	/usr/sbin/acpid	1737 ?	S<	0:00	[loop2]
10 ?	S	0:00	[ksoftirqd/0]	591 ?	Ss	0:00	avahi-daemon: running [Abhi-VirtualBox.local]	1740 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/xdg-permission-store
11 ?	I	0:00	[rcu_sched]	592 ?	Ss	0:00	/usr/sbin/cron -f	1751 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gnome-shell-calendar-server
13 ?	S	0:01	[migration/dbus-daemon -system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile -systemd-activa...	596 ?	Ssl	0:01	/usr/sbin/dbus-daemon -system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile -systemd-activa...	1762 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/evolution-source-registry
13 ?	S	0:00	[idle_inject/0]	597 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/sbin/NetworkManager --no-daemon	1771 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/evolution-calendar-factory
14 ?	S	0:00	[cpuhp/0]	617 ?	Ss	0:00	/usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers	1776 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/dconf-service
15 ?	S	0:00	[kdevtmpfs]	618 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/lib/polkit/polkitd --no-debug	1807 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/evolution-addressbook-factory
16 ?	I<	0:00	[netns]	625 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE	1847 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gvfsd-trash --spawner /1:3 /org/gtk/gvfs.
17 ?	S	0:00	[rcu_tasks_kthre]	628 ?	Ssl	0:12	/usr/lib/snapd/snapd	1850 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-color
18 ?	S	0:00	[kinteld]	629 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/switcheroo-control	1851 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-datetime
19 ?	S	0:00	[khungtaskd]	630 ?	Ss	0:00	/lib/systemd/systemd-logind	1856 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-housekeeping
20 ?	S	0:00	[oom_reaper]	634 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/lib/udisks2/udisksd	1858 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-keyboard
21 ?	I<	0:00	[writback]	641 ?	Ss	0:00	/sbin/wpa_supplicant -u -s -O /run/wpa_supplicant	1861 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-media-keys
22 ?	S	0:00	[kcompactd0]	653 ?	S	0:00	avahi-daemon: chroot helper	1863 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-power
23 ?	S	0:00	[kswapd]	699 ?	S	0:00	/usr/sbin/ModemManager --filter-policy=strict	1864 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-print-notifications
24 ?	SN	0:00	[khugepaged]	783 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/sbin/cups-browsed	1866 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-rfkill
70 ?	I<	0:00	[kintegrityd]	717 ?	Ss	0:00	/usr/sbin/cupsd -l	1875 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-screensaver-proxy
71 ?	I<	0:00	[kblockd]	720 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/bin/python3 /usr/share/unattended-upgrades/unattended-upgrade-shutdown --wait-for-signal	1881 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-smartcard
72 ?	I<	0:00	[blkcg_punt_bio]	753 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/bin/whoopsie -f	1885 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/evolution-data-server/evolution-alarm-mo
73 ?	I<	0:00	[tpm_dev_wq]	758 ?	Ss	0:00	/usr/sbin/kerneloops --test	1890 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-sound
74 ?	I	0:00	[ata_sff]	763 ?	Ss	0:00	/usr/sbin/kerneloops	1895 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-usb-protection
75 ?	I<	0:00	[kvm]	961 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/sbin/gdm3	1899 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-wacom
76 ?	I<	0:00	[edac-poller]	974 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/sbin/VBoxService --pidfile /var/run/vboxadd-service.sh	1902 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-wan
77 ?	I<	0:00	[devfreq_wq]	1036 ?	SNsl	0:00	/usr/libexec/rtkit-daemon	1904 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-xsettings
78 ?	S	0:00	[watchdog]	1097 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/lib/upower/upowerd	1930 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-disk-utility-notify
81 ?	S	0:00	[kswapd]	1297 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/colord	1947 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gsd-printer
82 ?	S	0:00	[ecryptfs-kthre]	1350 ?	Ssl	0:00	gdm-session-worker [pam/gdm-password]	2005 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/ibus-engine-simple
84 ?	I<	0:00	[kthrotld]	1369 ?	Ss	0:00	/lib/systemd/systemd --user	2137 ?	S<	0:00	[loop2]
85 ?	I<	0:00	[capi_thermal_pm]	1370 ?	S	0:00	(sd-pam)	2200 ?	Ssl	0:01	/usr/libexec/gnome-terminal-server
86 ?	S	0:00	[scsi_ah_0]	1379 ?	S<sl	0:00	/usr/bin/pulseaudio --daemonize=no --log-target=journal	2208 pts/0	Ss	0:00	bash
87 ?	I<	0:00	[scsi_tmf_0]	1382 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/bin/gnome-keyring-daemon --daemonize --login	2238 ?	S<	0:00	[loop1]
88 ?	S	0:00	[scsi_ah_1]	1385 ?	SNsl	0:00	/usr/libexec/tracker-miner-fs	2289 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gvfsd-metadata
90 ?	I<	0:00	[usr/tbld/0:1]	1387 ?	Ss	0:00	/usr/libexec/gvfs-gfsafc-volume-monitor	2392 ?	Ssl	0:00	update-notifier
91 ?	I<	0:00	[vfio-irqfd-clea]	1391 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gfsd	2458 ?	SNl	0:02	/usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/update-manager --no-update
92 ?	I	0:00	[worker/u2:3-events_unbound]	1396 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gvfsd-fuse /run/user/1000/gvfs -f -o big_writes	2610 ?	I	0:00	[worker/u2:0-events_unbound]
93 ?	I<	0:00	[ipv6_addrconf]	1409 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gvfs-udisks2-volume-monitor	2707 ?	I	0:00	[worker/0:0-events]
102 ?	I<	0:00	[kstrp]	1420 tty2	Sl+	0:00	/usr/lib/gdm3/gdm-x-session --run-script env GNOME_SHELL_SESSION_MODE=ubuntu /usr...	2708 ?	I	0:00	[worker/0:3-cgroup_destroy]
105 ?	I	0:00	[worker/u3:0]	1423 tty2	Sl+	0:02	/usr/lib/xorg/Xorg vt2 --displayfd 3 -auth /run/user/1000/gdm/Authority -	3107 ?	I	0:00	[worker/u2:1]
118 ?	S	0:00	[charter manager]	1424 ?	Ss	0:00	/usr/libexec/gfsd-gfsa-volume-monitor	3248 ?	Ss	0:00	sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -D [listener] 0 of 10-100 startu
160 ?	I	0:00	[worker/0:2-mm_percpu_wq]	1430 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gvfs-gphoto2-volume-monitor	4244 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/lib/packagekit/packagekitd
163 ?	S	0:00	[scsi_ah_2]	1434 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gvfs-goa-volume-monitor	4334 pts/0	R+	0:00	ps ax
164 ?	I<	0:00	[scsi_tmf_2]	1438 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/goa-daemon				
165 ?	I<	0:00	[worker/0:1H-kbblock]	1446 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/goa-identity-service				
166 ?	S	0:00	[jshd/sda-s-0]	1449 ?	Ss	0:00	/usr/libexec/gvfs-mtp-volume-monitor				
187 ?	I<	0:00	[ext4-rsv-conver]	1478 tty2	S	0:00	/usr/libexec/gnome-session-binary -systemd --systemd --session=ubuntu				
226 ?	S<S	0:00	/lib/systemd/systemd-journald	1550 ?	S	0:00	/usr/bin/VBoxClient --clipboard				
250 ?	Ss	0:00	/lib/systemd/systemd-udev	1551 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/bin/VBoxClient --clipboard				
251 ?	S	0:00	[irq/18-vmwgfx]	1562 ?	S	0:00	/usr/bin/VBoxClient --seamless				
252 ?	I<	0:00	[ttm_swap]	1563 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/bin/VBoxClient --seamless				
260 ?	S	0:00	[loop6]	1569 ?	S	0:00	/usr/bin/VBoxClient --draganddrop				
268 ?	S	0:00	[loop3]	1570 ?	Ssl	0:02	/usr/bin/VBoxClient --draganddrop				
279 ?	S	0:00	[loop4]	1577 ?	S	0:00	/usr/bin/VBoxClient --vmsvga				
283 ?	S<	0:00	[loop5]	1578 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/bin/VBoxClient --vmsvga				
296 ?	S	0:00	[loop7]	1585 ?	Ss	0:00	/usr/bin/ssh-agent /usr/bin/in-launch env GNOME_SHELL_SESSION_MODE=ubuntu /usr/bin/gnome-session -systemd --session=ubuntu				
297 ?	S	0:00	[loop8]	1604 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/at-spi-bus-launcher				
298 ?	S	0:00	[loop9]	1610 ?	S	0:00	/usr/bin/dbus-daemon -config-file=/usr/share/defaults/at-spi2/accessibility.conf --nofork --print-address 3				
300 ?	S<	0:00	[loop10]	1614 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gnome-session-ctl --monitor				
				1621 ?	Ssl	0:00	/usr/libexec/gnome-session-binary -systemd-service --session=ubuntu				

Towards Secure Systems

Now that we have process isolation, we can build more complex security features



File Access Control



Firewall



Anti-virus



Secure Logging


File Access Control



All disk **access** is mediated
by the OS

OS enforces access controls


*MANDATORY & Discretionary
access control policies*



File Access Control




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
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


Insecure Logging

Suppose Process 1 writes information to a log file

Malware can still destroy the log

- Add or remove entries
- Add fake entries
- Delete the whole log




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


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


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


Secure Logging

OS maintains a system log

Processes may write entries to the log using an OS API

Processes may not delete entries or the log






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


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


Secure Logging

OS maintains a system log

Processes may write entries to the log using an OS API

Processes may not delete entries or the log



Linux logging

```
abhi@abhi-VirtualBox:~$ ls /var/log
alternatives.log      boot.log             dist-upgrade         gdm3                 private
alternatives.log.1    boot.log.1           dmesg                gpu-manager.log      speech-dispatcher
alternatives.log.2.gz boot.log.2           dmesg.0              hp                    syslog
apparmor              boot.log.3           dmesg.1.gz          installer            syslog.1
appport.log           boot.log.4           dmesg.2.gz          journal              syslog.2.gz
appport.log.1         boot.log.5           dmesg.3.gz          kern.log             syslog.3.gz
apt                   boot.log.6           dmesg.4.gz          kern.log.1           syslog.4.gz
auth.log              boot.log.7           dpkg.log             kern.log.2.gz        syslog.5.gz
auth.log.1            bootstrap.log         dpkg.log.1           kern.log.3.gz        syslog.6.gz
auth.log.2.gz         btmp                 dpkg.log.2.gz        kern.log.4.gz        syslog.7.gz
auth.log.3.gz         btmp.1              faillog              lastlog              ubuntu-advantage.log
auth.log.4.gz         cups                fontconfig.log       openvpn              unattended-upgrades
abhi@abhi-VirtualBox:~$
```

Syslog

`/var/log/syslog` → system events

`/var/log/auth.log` → logins.

`/var/log/kern.log` → kernel events

`/var/log/cron` — list of periodically running processes.

syslog

Nov 10 10:20:24 abhi-VirtualBox systemd[1]: Reloading.
Nov 10 10:20:24 abhi-VirtualBox systemd[1]: /lib/systemd/system/dbus.socket:5: ListenStream= references a path below legacy directory /var/run/, updating /var/run/dbus/system_bus_socket → /run/dbus/system_bus_socket; please update the unit file accordingly.
Nov 10 10:20:24 abhi-VirtualBox systemd[1]: Starting Daily apt upgrade and clean activities...
Nov 10 10:20:24 abhi-VirtualBox systemd[1]: Starting OpenBSD Secure Shell server...
Nov 10 10:20:24 abhi-VirtualBox systemd[1]: Started OpenBSD Secure Shell server.
Nov 10 10:20:24 abhi-VirtualBox systemd[1]: apt-daily-upgrade.service: Succeeded.
Nov 10 10:20:24 abhi-VirtualBox systemd[1]: Finished Daily apt upgrade and clean activities.
Nov 10 10:20:24 abhi-VirtualBox systemd[1]: Reloading.
Nov 10 10:20:24 abhi-VirtualBox systemd[1]: /lib/systemd/system/dbus.socket:5: ListenStream= references a path below legacy directory /var/run/, updating /var/run/dbus/system_bus_socket → /run/dbus/system_bus_socket; please update the unit file accordingly.
Nov 10 10:20:28 abhi-VirtualBox dbus-daemon[596]: [system] Activating via systemd: service name='org.freedesktop.PackageKit' unit='packagekit.service' requested by '1.111' (uid=0 pid=4241 comm="/usr/bin/gdbus call --system --dest org.freedesktop" label="unconfined")


auth.log

```
Nov 10 10:18:55 abhi-VirtualBox sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by (uid=0)
Nov 10 10:18:55 abhi-VirtualBox sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root
Nov 10 10:19:01 abhi-VirtualBox sudo:      abhi : TTY=pts/0 ; PWD=/home/abhi ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/bin/apt install sshd
Nov 10 10:19:01 abhi-VirtualBox sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by (uid=0)
Nov 10 10:19:02 abhi-VirtualBox sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root
Nov 10 10:20:16 abhi-VirtualBox sudo:      abhi : TTY=pts/0 ; PWD=/home/abhi ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/bin/apt install openssh-server
Nov 10 10:20:16 abhi-VirtualBox sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by (uid=0)
Nov 10 10:20:22 abhi-VirtualBox useradd[3079]: new user: name=sshd, UID=126, GID=65534, home=/run/sshd, shell=/usr/sbin/nologin, from=none
Nov 10 10:20:22 abhi-VirtualBox usermod[3087]: change user 'sshd' password
Nov 10 10:20:22 abhi-VirtualBox chage[3094]: changed password expiry for sshd
Nov
```

Kernel logging

```
[ 0.000406] MTRR variable ranges enabled:
[ 0.000409] 0 base 0080000000 mask 7F00000000 uncachable
[ 0.000410] 1 base 007C000000 mask 7FFC000000 uncachable
[ 0.000412] 2 base 007A000000 mask 7FFF000000 uncachable
[ 0.000413] 3 base 0079000000 mask 7FFF000000 uncachable
[ 0.000415] 4 base 0078000000 mask 7FFF800000 uncachable
[ 0.000417] 5 base 2000000000 mask 6000000000 uncachable
[ 0.000418] 6 base 1000000000 mask 7000000000 uncachable
[ 0.000420] 7 base 4000000000 mask 4000000000 uncachable
[ 0.000421] 8 disabled
[ 0.000422] 9 disabled
[ 0.001256] x86/PAT: Configuration [0-7]: WB WC UC- UC WB WP UC- WT
[ 0.001570] last_pfn = 0x6fc4f max_arch_pfn = 0x400000000
[ 0.021713] esrt: Reserving ESRT space from 0x0000000068146518 to 0x0000000068146550.
[ 0.021729] e820: update [mem 0x68146000-0x68146fff] usable ==> reserved
[ 0.021847] check: Scanning 1 areas for low memory corruption
[ 0.021853] Using GB pages for direct mapping
[ 0.022564] RANDISK: [mem 0xc3c54000-0xc3ffff]
[ 0.022580] ACPI: Early table checksum verification disabled
[ 0.022584] ACPI: RSDP 0x000000006f117014 000024 (v02 INTEL )
[ 0.022589] ACPI: XSDT 0x000000006f116728 0000CC (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022590] ACPI: FACP 0x000000006f002000 000114 (v06 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 00010013)
[ 0.022606] ACPI: DSDT 0x000000006f08f000 042561 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022610] ACPI: FACS 0x000000006f1B1000 000040
[ 0.022614] ACPI: MCFG 0x000000006f0D5000 00003C (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 MSFT 00000097)
[ 0.022618] ACPI: SSDT 0x000000006f0D3000 001B44 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022621] ACPI: FIDT 0x000000006f0B5000 00009C (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 00010013)
[ 0.022627] ACPI: SSDT 0x000000006f08A000 0031C6 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022631] ACPI: HPET 0x000000006f070000 000038 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022635] ACPI: SSDT 0x000000006f086000 003384 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022639] ACPI: SSDT 0x000000006f0A0000 001478 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022643] ACPI: SSDT 0x000000006f0B0000 0032B0 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022648] ACPI: NHLT 0x000000006f0G6000 000020 (v00 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022652] ACPI: LPIT 0x000000006f07F000 000094 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022656] ACPI: SSDT 0x000000006f076000 002720 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022660] ACPI: SSDT 0x000000006f074000 00007C (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022664] ACPI: DBG0 0x000000006f079000 000034 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022668] ACPI: DBG2 0x000000006f078000 000054 (v00 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022672] ACPI: SSDT 0x000000006f076000 001B66 (v02 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 INTL 20160527)
[ 0.022677] ACPI: TPM2 0x000000006f074000 00004C (v04 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 00000000)
[ 0.022681] ACPI: DMAR 0x000000006f075000 0000A8 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 01000013)
[ 0.022685] ACPI: WSMT 0x000000006f07E000 000028 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 00010013)
[ 0.022689] ACPI: APIC 0x000000006f073000 0000F4 (v04 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 00010013)
[ 0.022693] ACPI: FPI0 0x000000006f072000 000044 (v01 INTEL NUC915FN 00000020 AMI 01000013)
[ 0.022707] ACPI: Local APIC address 0xf0000000
[ 0.023236] No NUMA configuration found
[ 0.023238] Faking a node at [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000080ffffff]
[ 0.023254] NODE_DATA(0) allocated [mem 0x80f0d5000-0x80ffffff]
[ 0.023698] Zone ranges:
[ 0.023700] DMA [mem 0x0000000000001000-0x0000000000ffffff]
[ 0.023702] DMA32 [mem 0x0000000001000000-0x0000000000ffffff]
[ 0.023703] Normal [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x0000000080ffffff]
[ 0.023705] Device empty
[ 0.023706] Movable zone start for each node
[ 0.023711] Early memory node ranges
[ 0.023713] node 0: [mem 0x0000000000010000-0x0000000000099fff]
[ 0.023714] node 0: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x0000000000c3ffff]
[ 0.023716] node 0: [mem 0x0000000000c40000-0x0000000000c4ffff]
[ 0.023717] node 0: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x0000000080ffffff]
[ 0.024270] Zeroed struct page in unavailable ranges: 41229 pages
[ 0.024272] Initmem setup node 0 [mem 0x0000000000010000-0x0000000080ffffff]
[ 0.024274] On node 0 totalpages: 8314611
[ 0.024276] DMA zone: 64 pages used for memmap
[ 0.024277] DMA zone: 25 pages reserved
[ 0.024278] DMA zone: 3998 pages, LIFO batch:0
[ 0.024279] DMA32 zone: 6910 pages used for memmap
[ 0.024380] DMA32 zone: 442197 pages, LIFO batch:63
[ 0.039990] Normal zone: 122944 pages used for memmap
[ 0.039991] Normal zone: 7868416 pages, LIFO batch:63
```

User space logging



abhi@abhi-VirtualBox:~\$ ps ax | grep log

```
596 ?    Ss   0:01 /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
625 ?    Ssl  0:00 /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
630 ?    Ss   0:00 /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1379 ?   S<sl 0:00 /usr/bin/pulseaudio --daemonize=no --log-target=journal
1382 ?   Sl   0:00 /usr/bin/gnome-keyring-daemon --daemonize --login
1387 ?   Ss   0:00 /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --session --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
4558 pts/1 S+   0:00 grep --color=auto log
abhi@abhi-VirtualBox:~$
```

systemd-journal

systemd-journal

/run/log


```
abhi@abhi-VirtualBox:~$ ls -al /run/
acpid.pid          gdm3/             plymouth/         thermald/
acpid.socket       gdm3.pid          sendsigs.omit.d/  tmpfiles.d/
alsa/             initctl           shm/              udev/
avahi-daemon/     initramfs/        snapd-snap.socket udisks2/
blkid/            lock/             snapd.socket      ufw.lock
console-setup/    log/              speech-dispatcher/ user/
crond.pid          mount/            spice-vdagentd/   utmp
crond.reboot      NetworkManager/  sshd/             uuid/
cups/             openvpn/          sshd.pid          vboxadd-service.sh
dbus/             openvpn-client/   sudo/
fsck/             openvpn-server/   systemd/

abhi@abhi-VirtualBox:~$ ls -al /run/log/
total 0
drwxr-xr-x  3 root root          60 Nov 10 10:03 .
drwxr-xr-x 31 root root         880 Nov 10 10:20 ..
drwxr-sr-x+ 2 root systemd-journal 40 Nov 10 10:03 journal
abhi@abhi-VirtualBox:~$ ls -al /run/log/journal/
total 0
drwxr-sr-x+ 2 root systemd-journal 40 Nov 10 10:03 .
drwxr-xr-x  3 root root            60 Nov 10 10:03 ..
abhi@abhi-VirtualBox:~$
```

File Access Control




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
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
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




Limitations

Malware can still cause damage

Discretionary access control means that isolation is incomplete






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




Limitations

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Anti-virus


Anti-virus process is **privileged**

- Often runs in Ring 0

Scans all files looking for **signatures**

- Each signature uniquely identifies a piece of malware

Files scanned on creation and access



Anti-virus


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
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
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
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
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Signature-based Detection

Key idea: identify invariants that correspond to malicious code or data

Example – anti-virus signatures

- List of code snippets that are unique to known malware

Problems with signatures

Signature-based Detection

Key idea: identify **invariants** that correspond to malicious code or data

Example – anti-virus signatures

- List of code snippets that are unique to known malware

Problems with signatures

- Must be updated frequently
- May cause false positives
 - Accidental overlaps with good programs and benign network traffic

Avast Malware Signature Update Breaks Installed Programs

Users of the free version of Avast antivirus unscathed

May 7, 2015 13:55 GMT · By Ionut Ilascu · Share:

A bad virus definition update from Avast released on Wednesday caused a lot of trouble, as it mistook various components in legitimate programs installed on the machine for malware.

The list of valid software affected by the signature update includes [Firefox](#), [iTunes](#), NVIDIA drivers, Google Chrome, Adobe [Flash Player](#), [Skype](#), Opera, [TeamViewer](#), ATI drivers, as well as products from [Corel](#) and components of Microsoft Office.

Avoiding Anti-virus

Malware authors go to great length to avoid detection by AV

Polymorphism

- Viral code mutates after every infection

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$$b = a + 10$$

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$$b = a + 10 \qquad b = a + 5 + 5$$

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The diagram shows three different code snippets for the same operation, each underlined in purple:

- $b = a + 10$
- $b = a + 5 + 5$
- $b = (2 * a + 20) / 2$

Handwritten purple annotations below the expressions:

- A bracket connects the first two expressions with the text "same operation".
- A bracket connects the first and third expressions with the text "different signature-".

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$$b = a + 10 \qquad b = a + 5 + 5 \qquad b = (2 * a + 20) / 2$$

Packing

- Malware code is encrypted, key is changed every infection
- Decryption code is vulnerable to signature construction
- Polymorphism may be used to mutate the decryption code

Firewall


Firewall process is
privileged

- Often runs in Ring 0

Selectively blocks network
traffic

- By process
- By port
- By IP address
- By packet content

Inspects outgoing and
incoming network traffic



Firewall


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
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
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
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
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Network Intrusion Detection Systems

NIDS for short

Snort

- Open source intrusion prevention system capable of real-time traffic analysis and packet logging
- Identifies malicious network traffic using signatures



Bro

- Open source network monitoring, analysis, and logging framework
- Can be used to implement signature based detection
- Capable of more complex analysis

