@inproceedings{ccdklrs20,
 title = {Multiparty Generation of an RSA Modulus},
 author = {Megan Chen and
             Ran Cohen and
             Jack Doerner and
             Yashvanth Kondi and
             Eysa Lee and
             Schuyler Rosefield and
             abhi shelat},
 howpublished = {CRYPTO'20},
 year = {2020},
}

We present a new multiparty protocol for the distributed generation of biprime RSA moduli, with security against any subset of maliciously colluding parties assuming oblivious transfer and the hardness of factoring.

Our protocol is highly modular, and its uppermost layer can be viewed as a template that generalizes the structure of prior works and leads to a simpler security proof. We introduce a combined sampling-and-sieving technique that eliminates both the inherent leakage in the approach of Frederiksen et al. (Crypto'18), and the dependence upon additively homomorphic encryption in the approach of Hazay et al. (JCrypt'19). We combine this technique with an efficient, privacy-free check to detect malicious behavior retroactively when a sampled candidate is not a biprime, and thereby overcome covert rejection-sampling attacks and achieve both asymptotic and concrete efficiency improvements over the previous state of the art.