@inproceedings{HCIKMSWV21,
 title = {Diogenes: Lightweight Scalable RSA Modulus Generation with a Dishonest Majority},
 author = {Carmit Hazay and
             Megan Chen and
             Yuval Ishai and
             Yuriy Kashnikov and
             Daniele Micciancio and
             Tarik Riviere and
             abhi shelat and
             Ruihan Wang and
             Muthu Venkitasubramaniam},
 howpublished = {Oakland'21},
 year = {2020},
}

In this work, we design and implement the first protocol for RSA modulus construction that can support thousands of parties and offers security against an arbitrary number of corrupted parties.

In a nutshell, we design the best protocol for this scale that is secure against passive corruption, then amplify it to obtain active security using efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments. Our protocol satisfies a stronger security guarantee where a deviating party can be identified when the protocol aborts (referred to as security with identifiable-abort) and allows for ``public verifiability’'.

Our passively secure protocol extends the recent work of Chen et al. that, in turn, is based on the blueprint introduced in the original work of Boneh-Franklin protocol (CRYPTO 1997, J. ACM, 2001). Specifically, we reduce the task of sampling a modulus to secure distributed multiplication, which we implement via an efficient threshold additively homomorphic encryption (AHE) scheme based on the Ring-LWE assumption. This results in a protocol where the amortized per-party communication cost grows logarithmically in the number of parties. In order to keep the parties lightweight, we employ an untrusted coordinator that is connected to all parties and performs all public and broadcast operations.

We amplify this protocol to obtain active security (with identifiable-abort) by attaching zero-knowledge proofs. We instantiate our ZK proof system by composing two different types of ZK proof systems: (1) the Ligero sub-linear zero-knowledge proof system (Ames et al., CCS 2017), and (2) Sigma-protocol for proving the knowledge of a discrete logarithm in unknown order groups (Shoup, Eurocrypt 2000).

We implemented both the passive and the active variants of our protocol and ran experiments using 2 to 4,000 parties. This is the first such implementation of any MPC protocol that can scale to more than 1,000 parties. For generating a 2048-bit modulus among 1,000 parties, our passive protocol executed in under 4 minutes and the active variant ran in 22 minutes.